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Everyday Aesthetics and 
Philosophical Hermeneutics
Carsten Friberg
This article discusses Everyday Aesthetics seen from philosophical hermeneutics where aesthetics is 
understood as a  form of knowledge. Two approaches are made, one concerning content, i.e. the 
knowledge made apparent to us in the aesthetic situation which is usually, but not exclusively, 
an exception to the everyday; another concerning the appearance of knowledge in form which, likewise, 
is also in danger of becoming isolated from the everyday. Everyday Aesthetics is reviewed through the 
same two approaches to understand how it differs from hermeneutics and where possible exchanges 
between them appear. | Keywords: Form, Interpretation, Sensuous, Knowledge, Art
1. Introduction
To discuss Everyday Aesthetics in relation to European traditions is an odd 
endeavour. Everyday Aesthetics is a  discipline, Europe is a  continent. 
Disciplines in philosophy may have geographic origins like the Vienna circle, 
but their practice is not related to geographic locations. Of course, some 
disciplines are more strongly positioned in some institutions and countries 
than in others. It makes a difference to the choice of topics and use of concepts 
if one's training is in German idealism or British empiricism, but today we find 
all philosophical disciplines practised everywhere. So  does this endeavour 
make sense?
Everyday Aesthetics is written with capital letters in the call which indicates it 
is not merely an interest in the relation of aesthetics to the everyday but 
an  established discipline with its own characteristics. Everyday Aesthetics 
comes from opposing the dominant focus on art in Anglo-American aesthetics 
(Saito, 2017, p. 1), which may explain why little interest is shown in other 
discourses sharing a  wider focus on cultural phenomena seen for example 
in  works by Herbert Marcuse (1969; 1972), Wolfgang Fritz Haug (1971/1986), 
Henri Lefebvre (1974/1991), and Jacques Rancière (2008). A  question is, if 
the little interest is due to an unbridgeable difference, or if there is a potential 
for exchange.
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I approach this question of Everyday Aesthetics and European traditions from 
philosophical hermeneutics to understand what they may have in common. 
First, I  will present a  hermeneutic understanding of aesthetics with 
an  emphasis on knowledge and form. Secondly, I  will look at Everyday 
Aesthetics through that lens to finally discuss if there are common interests 
and if they can enrich each other.
2. Aesthetics in a Hermeneutic View
Philosophical aesthetics is about reflecting on the knowledge implied in aesthetic 
analysis of artefacts. Such analysis is not philosophical but about characterising 
concrete artefacts. One can argue whether ‘philosophical’ is already implied 
in  aesthetics and thus a  superfluous addition, but often aesthetics is used 
for  aesthetic theories that are not also philosophical. My perspective 
is philosophical, but for simplicity, I will proceed without adding it.
Everyday Aesthetics belongs to philosophical aesthetics though this is only 
occasionally emphasized (e.g. Brady, 2005, p. 179; Saito, 2007, p. 11; Mandoki, 
2007, pp. 4 ff.; Leddy, 2012, p. 45). Nevertheless, I believe we can establish it to be 
the case. 
My approach from philosophical hermeneutics is from the tradition of Hans-  
Georg Gadamer where interpretation is not limited to interpreting texts, 
artworks, and cultural phenomena; it is to interpret our existence. With this 
in mind, I will also stop adding ‘philosophical’ to hermeneutics.
Hermeneutics, Gadamer writes (1993, p. 3), is the art of understanding what is not 
immediately apparent in what the other says. Karlfried Gründer (1982, pp. 78 f.) 
emphasizes how interpreting implies a  reflection on the difficulties 
of understanding – we do not interpret that which creates no difficulty. From this 
view, aesthetics is a  matter of making an intellectual effort of understanding 
rather than, for example, a  sensuous reaction to something. It is an intellectual 
effort that has a sensuous aspect.
I believe we have a key to what aesthetics is in the first lines of the conclusion 
to Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason (1788/2015, p. 129 (A 288)) where he states 
that the starry heavens above and the moral law within filling his mind with 
admiration and awe. Between the heavens above and the moral law within, 
between cosmology and norms, we find the concrete individual filled with 
admiration and awe. We individuals must ask how cosmology and norms become 
concrete for us and relate to our lives. These forms of concretisation are sensuous 
and as such, they affect us. 
An example illustrates the point. In Sophocles’ Antigone we encounter something 
concrete, a story about people and events, with a general point about conflicting 
norms, including in conflict with divine law, i.e. cosmology, and false behaviour. 
The individual figure, king Creon, and his actions are concrete events. These lead 
to tragic events when one believes that the authority as ruler depends on giving 
indispensable commands instead of reflecting on the conflicting matters of the 
situation. We learn from the concrete narrative of a  king’s  acts that power 
depends on good judgement and not merely on the authority to give commands. 
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Our position between cosmology and norms requires a concretisation of those 
abstract ideals which make them meaningful to us. Aesthetics is about: (1) how 
this knowledge is provided through the concretisation, and (2) the form 
in  which it is done. Aesthetics investigates the form and legitimacy of 
the process of making sense of something by sensorial means that affect us and 
enable us to understand what is otherwise inaccessible or at least difficult 
to comprehend. 
Sophocles’s Antigone exemplifies how cosmology and norms can be translated 
to concrete individuals allowing us to proceed from the concrete to the 
general, i.e. to understand norms from the concrete narrative.
The translation between concrete and general is one of the most difficult 
problems in philosophy. I call the object in front of me a tree but the word tree 
can be applied to innumerable many phenomena and does not exhaust the 
concrete tree I  encounter. Nevertheless, I  do  understand the object in front 
of  me when classifying it to be of a  kind, as a  tree, similar to other objects. 
We  distinguish conceptual knowledge from a  painting or poetic expression 
about the tree. The former aims at unambiguously translating a  multiplicity 
of  perspectives on a  phenomenon present into what is considered to be 
essential for us to know; the latter goes the opposite direction to make the tree 
present to us in its phenomenal richness through a  concrete representation. 
The former is as a matter of knowledge eliminating the need for interpretation 
– to say this is a  tree is immediately understood in any normal context; 
the  latter is an aesthetic form inviting us to an interpretation that does not 
come to a final conclusion. 
The painter’s tree is concrete, yet it invites me to see something more. This is 
why we enjoy looking at pictures, writes Aristotle (Poetics 1448 b15 ff.). 
We  come to understand something, otherwise we only take pleasure in the 
colours. Richard Hamann (1919, p. 21) writes likewise in his Ästhetik that our 
interest in aesthetics is not in how one experiences (erlebt) an image, which is 
a  matter of psychology; aesthetics is about the relation to spiritual sciences 
(Geisteswissenschaften) – in what the perception of the image means and the 
conditions for it being meaningful. 
The painter’s  tree appears in an intuition (Anschauung) where something is 
made present to us without being conceptually determined – to say the 
painting is of a  tree does not exhaust it as painting. Joachim Ritter calls it 
a double movement when the object of the intuition, like the house of God, is 
more than we intuit and also something in itself, an artwork (Ritter, 2010, 
p. 78; cf. Bubner, 1989, pp. 62 ff.). 
We must here abandon discussions whether intuition is defined as non-
conceptual (Kant) or we should acknowledge also an immediate understanding 
in form of an intellectual intuition (Fichte). They are, however important to 
German Idealism and consequently to the traditions formed by its heritage 
such as hermeneutics (Bubner, 1989, pp. 56 ff.). However, we should pay 
attention to what Gadamer (1993, pp. 191 f.) says, that Kant’s division between 
sensuous intuition and concepts is a  problematic abstraction. Kant himself 
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is  aware of how the division serves its purpose for achieving knowledge 
of phenomena in nature where concepts provide us with rules for determining 
what is given in our intuitions; however, this is something different from 
asking about nature itself. Nature is not given in any intuition as it forms the 
limit to our intuitions and experiences he writes in Critique of pure Reason 
(1781/1787/1998, B 753). Nature is an interpretation and requires a reflection, 
the central topic of Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgement (1790/1799/2000). 
Kant points at a  problem central to aesthetics, namely the meeting point 
between senses and spirit (Geist) where the intuition is no mere intuition but 
an invitation for a  reflection in which we search for a  determination which 
proves to be indeterminate because it is inconclusive. The tree we determine 
because we have a  concept is different from the poet's  tree that is given in 
an intuition as something more than an intuition, hence, it is indeterminate. 
Cosmology and norms can be translated to concrete individuals and be given 
in intuitions like Sophocles’ Antigone or the painter's tree but they also invite 
us to search for a  meaning-giving frame for our interpretations. 
The painter's tree represents a tree as well as an invitation to reflect on what 
nature is and our human relation to nature, and Sophocles’s Antigone makes 
us reflect on norms and laws in the world we live in.
Hence, the aesthetic artefacts, whether a painting, a play or other forms, invite 
us to reflect on what makes sense for our everyday existence. The occasion for 
this reflection is when we step out of the everyday. Such occasions are when we 
participate in festivals representing a  divine order giving a  religious 
explanation to our existence, or when we participate in a  profane and 
humanistic celebration such as a  nation's  liberation, independence, and 
constitution giving meaning to the secular order we live in (Bubner, 1989, 
pp. 144 ff.). In our modern world such events have often lost their significance 
and do not define our world-interpretation in the same way as before. Festivals 
do  not offer an authoritative world-interpretation or give consolation for 
suffering like before. Instead, suffering has become a practical problem to solve 
rather than to explain. Bubner writes that we expect to find consolation 
in  having time off for festivals that become parties and leisure time and not 
a moment of meaning. The props of the festival then become themselves the 
focus of attention instead of the interpretation they previously offered – they 
become aesthetic objects (Marquard, 1989, p. 13; cf. Gadamer, 1993, p. 110). 
However, such a  focus-change on the festival does not discredit the model 
of  interpretation of our existence embedded in it; it is merely the content, 
meaning and significance that change.
The dissolution of universal frames of interpretation allows aesthetic artefacts 
in the form of artistic experiments to step out of our everyday lives and offer us 
alternative interpretations of our world. In the context of the religious cult, 
the  ceremonial props would invite us into the community celebrated. 
With the dissolution of this frame the artists' task changes. To follow Gadamer 
(1993, p. 98), the artist now creates a community. While the religious festival 
intended a  universal community, and some artistic ambitions of the avant-
garde did likewise for a political community, this is also a characteristic we can 
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apply in moderate forms, such as the props of a  music festival and a  sub-
cultural community. Aesthetics is not about the content of the interpretation, 
but about the means of it.
Hence, the exception to the everyday does not rule out aesthetic dimensions of 
ordinary artefacts and situations. However, the interest in the exceptional is 
emphasized when a  visit to the art museum can be said to change our views 
(Gadamer, 1993, p. 117) and when the exceptional artefact is one we keep 
coming back to because we never finish with it (Bubner, 1989, p. 60). 
The  hermeneutic perspective does not exclude more trivial examples of the 
everyday, it just takes more interest in the significant moments.
Sophocles’s  Antigone tells us something through affecting us. Following 
Aristotle, we learn how king Creon too late comes to recognise, anagnorisis, the 
fatal error of his behaviour at which point a  reversal, peripeteia, happens, 
tragically too late. Anyone could give us the same information, but we 
understand differently through the play. 
How it works, and how well it works, are matters of aesthetic analysis, 
i.e.  analysis of the different components in the composition – like the 
execution of anagnorisis and peripeteia, along with elements of style, figures 
etc., and of receptions. If the aesthetic experience offers a moment off from the 
everyday it could be considered a moment of aesthetic pleasure. Nevertheless, 
aesthetic pleasure, appreciation and similar characteristics so  common 
in Everyday Aesthetics are rare in hermeneutics. Hans Robert Jauß (1982/1997, 
p. 71) even writes that whoever has the courage to say they enjoy or appreciate 
art will expose themselves to the accusation of satisfying themselves with 
mere kitsch or mere consumption – which in fact is not different from 
Aristotle's point above about only taking pleasure in the colours of an image. 
There is an important difference between what we feel and what 
the significance of what we feel is. 
The tragedy makes me feel something which is conveyed and emphasized by its 
structure. We should keep in mind that aesthetics has its origin in rhetoric that 
is not merely about persuading someone to think something specific but to 
make them want to think it when we follow Quintilian in 
The Orator’s Education (1921, pp. 417 ff. (VI, 2)). As human beings we sense, feel 
and react emotionally along with what we think, and different structural 
elements can correspond with and enhance our feelings. Hence, the trembling 
and terror I  may feel at the tragedy are feelings I  share with others in the 
audience, and I can embark on a learning process in which I come to sense and 
feel in ways similar to others. We express this in judgements of taste. They are 
not merely about evaluating aesthetic qualities of something but about 
demonstrating social affiliation and cohesion through the evaluation. 
The analysis of how narratives, images, and artefacts work, of how we feel 
about them, points towards knowledge as we do not stay at the mere image or 
narrative. What is given in an intuition is no mere representation, in that case, 
the painter's tree is just identified as a representation of an object. An image is 
something we read, and it involves our imagination and thinking which is set 
108CARSTEN FRIBERG Everyday Aesthetics and Philosophical Hermeneutics
at work by the form (Gadamer, 1993, pp. 193 f.). Sophocles’s  Antigone may 
teach us something about rulers and conflicting norms by means of sensorial 
effects that integrate into our world-interpretation far better than when 
explained in a sleepy lecture. The aesthetic situation, object, play etc. provide 
no immediate pleasure, but an affective situation that requires an effort of us 
to make sense of (Gadamer, 1993, pp. 199 f.). The pleasure of such 
an interpreting effort, Odo Marquard  (1982, p. 31) says, is that we do not stay 
the same but learn – it is the pleasure of saving us the effort of remaining 
ignorant.
If we return to Kant’s starry heavens and moral law, we may easily wander off 
into cosmology and norms – into scientific knowledge and ethical conflicts. 
Yet, we also wish to come back and ask what they mean for our concrete lives. 
Aesthetics is about taking us, as concrete individuals, seriously by making the 
abstract and universal concrete. This is why it becomes important that 
the  analysis of aesthetic elements does not become isolated from the world 
the  aesthetic artefact belongs to. Such an isolation creates what Gadamer 
(1993, pp. 9 ff.) calls an aesthetic consciousness. He is critical about this as the 
isolation turns the aesthetic relation into a mere appreciation of artworks that 
lose significance for our experiences and knowledge. Art is supposed to offer 
perspectives to our everyday existence; an aesthetic consciousness only 
demonstrates one's  skills as an art lover where one takes pleasure in oneself 
as an art critique.
3. Everyday Aesthetics Approached From Hermeneutics
I  will now pursue the two questions from hermeneutics about knowledge and 
form in the dominant view on Everyday Aesthetics.
Kant's  starry heavens and moral law translated into our concrete existence 
in  a  narrative like Sophocles’s  Antigone exemplifies what Everyday Aesthetics 
finds as a  narrow view of aesthetics. Instead of viewing something for the sake 
of  our everyday life, we should take an interest in the everyday as it is. Yuriko 
Saito (2017, p. 56) writes that we should care about “the familiar experienced 
as familiar.” 
To say what everyday signifies causes difficulties for Everyday Aesthetics 
(Naukkarinen, 2013). It is paradoxically how we experience the everyday without 
negating its everydayness – without taking it out of the ordinary to be 
foregrounded and defamiliarized in order to make something invisible visible 
(Saito, 2017, pp. 20 ff.; cf. 2007, pp. 50 f.; Leddy, 2012, p. 77). Or it is difficult to say 
what is aesthetic about our experience if objects remain in their ordinariness and 
resist being taken out of it, and our aesthetic experience of  them is in their 
familiarity as unnoticed (Haapala, 2005, pp. 50 ff.). These positions and their 
respective difficulties are summarized by Jane Forsey (2013). Despite 
the  variations, I  think there will be agreement that hermeneutics burdens 
the  everyday with too many expectations of meaning and with too much 
exception from it. If aesthetics relates to making us aware and understanding our 
lives, the approach, according to Everyday Aesthetic, should not be through 
exceptions but through an increased awareness of what happens in our lives. 
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What is then, the interpretation of our everyday lives that aesthetics should 
turn its attention to instead of occupying itself with exceptions; and how does 
it affect us in forms worthy of aesthetic appreciation?
The festival is what Everyday Aesthetics seems to say holds no particular 
privilege in giving significance to the everyday. It is not that the celebrations 
are insignificant, but they do not make sense of the everyday in any emphatic 
sense; we can only say it makes sense to have celebrations. Perhaps they 
deserve attention for how we dress up and hold the celebration, but not for 
sense-making. This is in contrast to the hermeneutic view in which the 
wedding is a  celebration of a  ceremony with a  significant meaning for the 
celebrated couple and their relatives. The enjoyment of the dress, food, music 
and other aesthetic features of the celebration is secondary to what it signifies. 
To make them objects of aesthetic pleasure is a mistake of perspective, like if 
one of the guests is inappropriately dressed and comes to steal the attention 
from the couple. 
In a  culture that is aestheticized, i.e. where everything is subject to an 
aesthetic treatment and consideration, the difference between party and 
everyday is erased. Everyone can now celebrate oneself. The wedding becomes 
the excuse for having a  celebration instead of the celebration being of the 
wedding, i.e. of the significance of the ceremony. In a hermeneutic perspective, 
this is a  loss of significance because the exception stops being an exception. 
Where the everyday becomes a permanent festival the aesthetic turns into the 
anaesthetic – it loses the explanatory potential for the everyday and becomes 
insignificant (Bubner, 1989, pp. 152 f.; Marquard, 1989, pp. 11 ff.). For Everyday 
Aesthetics, on the contrary, it is the opposite. Now the everyday can step out of 
the shadow of special events and become more significant. However, we should 
be careful as significance may be considered in two different ways by the two 
approaches. 
In a  hermeneutical understanding, the exception is a  significant event 
because it gives meaning to our everyday life. In Everyday Aesthetics, we give 
meaning to something and grant it significance. From this view, 
hermeneutics will be seen as falsely believing that a prosaic everyday must be 
rescued to make it reveal its hidden poetry (Saito, 2017, p. 12), and also for 
neglecting experiences of what is pretty, shiny, glittering, and cute because 
they will be considered incapable of generating profound and meaningful 
experience that has significance (Saito, 2017, pp. 39 f.). The problem for 
Everyday Aesthetics is not that art generates significant aesthetic moments; 
the problem is that an art-oriented approach ignores aesthetic moments 
in  the everyday. The experiences of the everyday are far more important for 
guiding us in our daily life than the exceptional experiences; whoever 
neglects them demonstrates inattentiveness and mindlessness (Saito, 2017, 
p. 25) as well as apathy (Mandoki, 2007, p. 93). To become aware of everyday 
moments and cultivate an aesthetic appreciation of them is to develop 
“a mindful way of living” and, furthermore, to “restore our mode of being-in-
the-world” (Saito, 2017, p. 59). In this context, Sherri Irvin (2008, p. 27) 
discusses whether scratching an itch can be considered an aesthetic 
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experience, i.e. an experience in which we are able to discriminate qualities 
and meaningful features we can be attentive to for their own sake. If that 
suffices as qualifying, the argument is, scratching an itch can be included into 
aesthetics. It enables one to become more sensuously aware in trivial 
situations like when attending a  meeting; one can acquire an “ability to 
transform such moments into occasions for aesthetic satisfaction” (Irvin, 
2008, p. 32).
Of course, a question is what is considered qualities and meaningful features. 
I  think this question finds different answers in Everyday Aesthetics. Emily 
Brady represents what may be considered one extreme here. In her discussion 
of Kant as representative of a classical tradition, she opposes what she sees 
as a traditional rejection of smells and tastes from aesthetics due to their lack 
of complexity and, consequently, their lack of an intellectual effort of making 
distinctions. However, I  think her example of comparing tastes of ice cream 
by memorizing and imagining tastes to determine whether I  like a  taste or 
not (Brady, 2005, p. 183) confuses an ordinary sense perception in which 
something is identified as something with an aesthetic. Her appeal to 
cognitive values in  smells and tastes valued through appreciation does not 
do the job. It is not a matter of aesthetics if I am served a dish of seafood in 
which I, in its complexity, detect that something is wrong and ask to have it 
replaced; I simply do not want to have a bad stomach. 
If an imperative of Everyday Aesthetics is to be attentive about our sensorial 
relations because aesthetics is about sensory perception and sensibility 
(Saito, 2017, p. 1) – a  theory of sensibility as it is called by Arnold Berleant 
(2010, p. 155), we should also acknowledge that not any sensorial perception 
is aesthetic. Brady points at how the values of smelling socks or the pine trees 
in the forest are socially or culturally differentiated. Nevertheless, she does 
not pursue questions of the relation between sense and an informed reaction 
to the sensed (Brady, 2005, p. 180). Berleant (2010, pp. 27 ff. and pp. 51 ff.) is 
explicit about how training is essential for sense perception, and that we 
must understand such training to be culturally filtered and inherently 
cultural. Epistemology and aesthetics here overlap regarding perception 
because our relation to the world is an active, sensuous engagement 
(Mandoki, 2007, pp. 67 ff.). What matters then, is the interpretation (Mandoki, 
2007, p. 9) through which aesthetics is what highlights appreciative effects of 
perception (Mandoki, 2007, p. 47). The cultural filtering and training form our 
perception of and emotional relation to our cultural environment. 
It is far from easy to understand the exact uses of perception and experience 
in  Everyday Aesthetics, but according to Berleant (2010, p. 29) an aesthetic 
experience is both sensory and an experience of meaning, and consequently, it 
relates an aesthetic evaluation to social, political, and environmental values 
(Saito, 2017, p. 98). In the aesthetic experience, our relation to the world differs 
from ordinary experiences that are about understanding what something is, 
which is an act that separates us from the concrete and present thing. In the 
aesthetic experience we have an opportunity to engage differently with it. 
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While this seems to be a  meeting point with hermeneutics, I  think it is also 
a  point where the traditions part. A  hermeneutic interest is to understand 
better what this meaning in the aesthetic experience is, i.e. the form it has and 
the knowledge it provides us with, which is an occasion for challenging our 
ordinary understandings and making way for different perspectives on it. 
Everyday Aesthetics is about improving our sensorial awareness and becoming 
more attentive to what there is in our everyday life to enrich it. We should work 
on improving and changing what we otherwise find will impoverish and harm 
the quality of life and environment (Saito, 2017, p. 216). Not to make use of the 
potential of aesthetics here is a missed opportunity (Saito, 2017, p. 198). 
Saito’s (2017, pp. 95 f.) examples of improvements are e.g. in disputes over wind 
farms that are found aesthetically unacceptable to imagining what could be 
even worse or to accept a situation that is impossible to change like conditions 
in the Gaza strip where “everyday aesthetic experience can help its residents 
retain a  sense of humanity, dignity, and resilience” (Saito, 2017, p. 19). The 
conservative hermeneutic philosopher Odo Marquard sounds almost radical 
in  comparison. He explains that experience (Erfahrung) is when our 
expectations are met with a  veto from reality (Marquard, 1982, p. 23). In our 
contemporary culture, he writes, we lack experiences because of its 
accelerating processes of changes. Due to our limited capacity for changes, we 
cannot adjust to them all. Instead, we choose, on the personal scale, to stick to 
routines and habits, and in the societal scale to prognosis and statistics 
enabling planning of actions. In a world of accelerating changes, we insist on 
our expectations and ignore the veto that could give us experiences – like when 
our plans lose touch with reality. Everyday Aesthetics would ask us to pay more 
attention to our reality, to be more sensitive. Marquard, on the contrary, 
suggests that instead of seeking consolation with an increasingly changing 
world we may find experiences that can make us see our world in ways that give 
a veto to our expectations which are increasingly out of touch with reality. It is 
those kinds of experiences that are called aesthetic. Hence, it does not help to 
find the aesthetic in the everyday if we live in a world where the everyday can 
only be saved through the aesthetic (Marquard, 1982, p. 30).
We have a  century of artistic experiments intended to make us discover 
perspectives on the world we live in. It is possible these experiments have been 
in vain because of the creation of what Mandoki (2007, p. 24) calls an aesthetic 
attitude, an attitude of the snob. The opposition of Everyday Aesthetics to 
an aesthetic attitude found in institutionalized art is shared by hermeneutics. 
Gianni Vattimo (1997, pp. 58 ff.) gives an illustrative example. We find visitors 
in the Sant’Ivo alla Sapienza church in Rome. One is religious who is present to 
pray, the other a tourist. The latter has an aesthetic experience of a kind similar 
to a visit to a museum, an experience different from experiencing a room that 
translates the space for prayers into a concrete, sensuous form. If the aesthetic 
experience becomes self-sufficient,  i.e. about the aesthetic form itself and not 
what it gives form to, we encounter what Gadamer (1960/1990, pp. 87 ff.) 
considers as the dubiousness of the concept of aesthetic cultivation (Bildung). 
Now, the form becomes our object of interest and we care for the techniques 
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used to produce the appearance and how the outcome, the artwork, is. We 
analyse and communicate to like minded, now called aestheticians, in aesthetic 
judgements. What Gadamer finds dubious is when this approach to the 
aesthetic object serves to differentiate and distinguish it from non-aesthetic 
objects. It becomes a  separation where the aesthetic object loses its place in 
the world (Gadamer, 1960/1990, pp. 90 ff.).
Everyday Aesthetics, I  believe, places itself in difficulties here. It shares 
Gadamer’s critique of losing the focus on our lives to excel in institutionalized 
discourses on art. However, it does not liberate itself from them. We live, Saito 
tells us, an aesthetic life and have aesthetic experiences where aesthetic 
includes “any reactions we form towards the sensuous and/or design qualities 
of any object, phenomenon or activity” (Saito, 2007, p. 9; cf. Leddy, 2012, 
pp.  259 f.). This use of aesthetic is all-inclusive. It seems to exclude 
investigating what an aesthetic life is and aesthetic experiences are, out of 
a  fear that qualifications could exclude anything. The inclusiveness is seen as 
a liberation of aesthetics from narrow discourses by moving beyond canonical 
aesthetic terms such as beautiful, elegant, graceful, and ugly – Thomas Leddy 
(2012, pp. 64 ff.) suggests including neat and messy even though later in the 
book he moderates their significance and admits they are not “to be called 
aesthetic qualities in the fullest sense of the term” (Leddy, 2012, p. 236). 
My difficulty here concerns what it is we come to understand better in light of 
these categories. Contrasting them to how Sianne Ngai (2010) suggests zany, 
interesting, and cute as categories with a  critical potential for analyzing art, 
cultural artefacts and formations, political and economical forms in late 
capitalism, I  fail to see what we learn from Leddy’s  categories, developed 
further by Saito (2007, pp. 152 ff.), and how they provide anything else than 
an adjustment of the dubious aesthetic differentiation. I can now be engaged in 
discussing a  neat room as the occasion for experiencing “a  certain pleasure 
in apprehending that neatness“ (Leddy, 2012, p. 229), which, we are told in the 
preceding page, is no mere personal preference but an expectation of others 
seeing the same. This appears to be a  mere substitution of one aesthetic 
characterization with another, but we do  not overcome the logic of aesthetic 
differentiation because we expand the characteristic to also include neat, 
ordered, right, clean and similar terms. Saito finds that we currently lack 
a  discourse for analyzing, educating and improving our relation to everyday 
artefacts and activities (Saito, 2017, p. 201) – we lack it to the point of asking 
for a “new aesthetic vocabulary” (Saito, 2017, p. 208) and I wonder what is then 
wrong with Ngai’s suggestion. 
If the aesthetic form should not merely repeat institutionalized discourses 
expressed in judgements of taste, we should give attention to how something 
is  interpreted and become apparent to us in a  sensuous form that affects us. 
The form should make the interpretation appear as one we not only 
understand but also feel we understand and feel to be part of our world. It is, 
parallel to Quintilian, to not only make us think but to make us want to think 
something. This is why it is important to recognize the “cultural and cognitive 
filters” that qualify an aesthetic experience (Berleant, 2010, p. 61). Saito (2017, 
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p. 54) demonstrates this well in examples such as reactions to a  practice like 
hanging laundry where she has adopted ideals that make her hang it in ways 
that appear “as inoffensive, orderly, and organized as possible” i.e. “informed 
by spectator-like aesthetic judgments.” However, it is difficult to see how a new 
vocabulary instead of the existing one helps here. She asks for it in relation to 
being able to re-evaluate some aesthetic values such as to be able to appreciate 
a wildflower garden which one could suspect in fact just reveals her reflection 
on her own values – on many occasions she express a  discomfort with what 
looks messy and unkempt (e.g. Saito, 2001, p. 93; cf. 2017, p. 125). But a  new 
vocabulary does not question the aesthetic differentiation revealed to be 
present in the many examples in Everyday Aesthetics; at its best, it only 
changes some of the rules of play. 
It should be clear how important it is to reflect on what the forming of our 
sensorial awareness is, on what is called perceptual commons by Berleant 
(2010, p. 209). Cultural norms appear in a sensorial practice and make us relate 
to it and appropriate it. Does it then help to expand categories of aesthetic 
appreciation from the art-related to the everyday? Are inattentiveness and 
apathy that Everyday Aesthetic wants to battle met by new terms and 
vocabularies that enable different experiences to be felt as significant? Or is it 
rather about understanding better the significance of our senses in our relation 
to and interpretation of the environment? Is it about understanding how this 
is also a  central philosophical problem about the relation between sense and 
interpretation? These seem to be questions marking differences between 
Everyday Aesthetics and hermeneutics.
4. Concluding Discussion
Albert Camus notes in The Myth of Sisyphus (1942/1979, p. 95) that if a writer 
like Dostoievsky dwells at a question such as whether existence is either a lie or 
eternal only to ask this question, he would be a  philosopher. But because he 
demonstrates the consequences of such a question for a human existence he is 
a poet. He makes it concrete for us. It is the task of aesthetics to understand 
what this concretization in the sensorial form of literature is. This 
concretization is not limited to art, but art has taken a prominent position here 
because it often makes space for moments of reflection. 
It does not require a  Dostoievsky to become aware of our sensuous and 
perceptual reactions and relations. It is a  matter of awareness. Hermeneutics 
and Everyday Aesthetics will agree to that, and to opposing ideas of aesthetics 
limited to the institutionalized situation. The differences between them appear 
when it comes to expectations of aesthetics being about an interpretative 
translation of general views into concrete and sensuous appearances, and 
about the form of these appearances that through affecting us make the 
meaning appear. Such an emphasis on aesthetics as a matter of knowledge is 
not expressed in Everyday Aesthetics despite interest shown in the cultural 
content of perceptions and appreciation. 
I  have suggested that a  point of departure between the traditions is the 
differences in what a  significant aesthetic experience is – whether it is 
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an experience that gives meaning to something or one that plays an important 
role in one's  life. This is well illustrated by Leddy’s  misreading of 
Heidegger’s  Die  Ursprung des Kunstwerkes (1950/1980) when he suggests that 
Heidegger’s point about a Van Gogh painting of a peasant woman’s shoes is that 
“great art enhances and intensifies our experience of the everyday” and brings us 
to “experience the everyday with wonder” (Leddy, 2012, p. 110). But Heidegger is 
not interested in a  significant experience of something in our everyday life. 
The painting appears in relation to asking what a thing is, and here the painting, 
as painting, reveals something about our understanding of  things – different 
from our understanding of a thing represented in the painting. The point is not 
what it makes us see, like the peasant woman's  life; it is that it makes us see, 
i.e. something is made apparent to us through art. The origin of the work of art is 
not where or what art originates from, but how something originates from 
art.  Leddy’s  misreading confuses the act of seeing with what we see. It is no 
shortcoming of Heidegger that he does not reflect on how the peasant woman 
can also set aside the demands of the everyday and enjoy the familiar scene as 
Arto Haapala (2005, p. 51) suggests. Heidegger’s  concern is not for immersing 
oneself in contemplating one’s surroundings or finding a moment of wonder – if 
anything of such reflection is made it will show the fundamental difference 
between the peasant woman seeing her harsh conditions of living while we 
experience our privilege of taking a pause to enjoy the nature as landscape. 
To discuss Heidegger’s  analysis would take us beyond the scope here, but one 
point should be emphasized to pin the difference between Everyday Aesthetics 
and hermeneutics. Recognizing the everyday in aesthetic and philosophical 
contexts should not obscure that we must ask what the everyday is rather than 
what we encounter in it, the latter is in far better hands in empirical disciplines 
than in philosophy. We do not see the everyday in the everyday; we interpret it to 
be our everyday. It is not what can be significant for me, and for the peasant 
woman, the spectator of Saito’s  laundry, or the Palestinian in a  newly bombed 
Gaza, we should take an interest in; it is the frame of interpretation granting it 
the significance we find or ascribe to it. 
To focus on what appears in the everyday, to include it into existing categories of 
aesthetics, and perhaps to learn from sensuous practices in other cultures to 
make us become more attentive, is to practice the aesthetic differentiation 
Gadamer finds dubious. The integration of everyday experiences into 
an  aesthetic discourse is no reflection on our existence but a  refinement of 
an instrumental use of aesthetic views and notions. It only concerns what exists 
for us. Haapala’s (2005, p. 51) critique is false when he finds that the avant-garde 
art’s endeavours of bringing art into the everyday have failed because they only 
manage to estrange the everyday and reinforce the institutional aesthetic 
discourse that neglects the everyday. It is true if one neglects the artistic 
intentions and reproduces the dubious aesthetic discourse of differentiation, but 
why reproduce that pattern when the exact motivation of Everyday Aesthetics is 
to oppose it, at least according to Saito (2017, p. 1)? For a  philosophical 
aesthetics the question must be about the frame of interpretation we encounter, 
its origin, implications and legitimacy.
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Saito and Berleant both emphasize how the interest in Everyday Aesthetics is 
not merely for having a  larger field of phenomena that can be aesthetically 
appreciated and thus enrich our aesthetic enquiry; it also has “the potential for 
improving the quality of life and the world” (Saito, 2007, p. 52) and for 
revealing the morally negative (Berleant, 2010, p. 167). Granted their point that 
some institutionalized forms of aesthetics seems to take more interest in 
performing a role as art critic and aesthetician – we know this figure from Kant 
(1790/1799/2000, § 33) as the virtuoso of taste – a question is if the aesthetic 
dimension in the everyday can deliver the expected improvements. 
I think we should see this in relation to what the expectations are. If they are 
modest there can be an improvement through acceptance when we learn “to 
find positive values in things we normally dislike or detest” (Saito, 2007, 
p. 132). The same holds for strategies of communication when the issue can be 
protests against wildflower gardens. Here, aesthetic standards and values are 
created and changed through affective means. They are responsible for forming 
sensuous reactions and cultural filters that become perceptual commons. 
The sensuous forms may form challenges, like Haapala says about avant-garde 
art, and of course, they can become estranged from our everyday life. However, 
this can also be an opportunity to make an effort of interpretation, like José 
Ortega y Gasset so  well investigates in his essay The dehumanization of art 
(1925/1968) written in light of complaints of the new art forms of his age. 
Gadamer asks the same in relation to modern mass and popular culture that 
perhaps, due to a  generation gap, are incomprehensible for him. He must 
acknowledge them to be used in rational ways by a  generation having 
an understanding that differs from his; for him to understand them will imply 
an effort of interpretation (Gadamer, 1993, p. 141).
If aesthetics, as I  have suggested, is about expectations of an interpretative 
translation making general views to appear in concrete and sensuous 
appearances where the form of these appearances convey the meaning by 
affecting us, Everyday Aesthetics may provide hermeneutics with more 
attention to and insights in some of these phenomena. In return, it may benefit 
from an understanding coming from hermeneutics of aesthetics as providing 
knowledge to answer questions that seem to lurk just beneath the intentions of 
Everyday Aesthetics.
I wish to thank Lucy Lyons for help with the language.
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